Abstract-The symmetric encryption problem which manifests itself when two parties must securely transmit a message with a short shared secret key is considered in conjunction with a computationally unbounded adversary. As the adversary is unbounded, any encryption scheme must leak information about ; in particular, the mutual information between and its ciphertext cannot be zero. Despite this, a family of encryption schemes is presented that guarantee that for any message space in 0 1 with minimum entropy and for any Boolean function : 0 1 0 1 , no adversary can predict ( ) from the ciphertext of with more than 1
I. INTRODUCTION
O NE of the simplest and most secure encryption systems is the one time pad: two parties who have agreed on a uniformly selected secret key can exchange a single message by transmitting , this parity being taken componentwise. If we think of the message and the secret key as independent random variables, then it is easy to see that the message and the ciphertext are uncorrelated: we say that this encryption system offers perfect secrecy.
One unfortunate consequence of this absolute security guarantee is that any such system must use a fresh secret key for each new message of length . Indeed, regardless of the system employed, if a uniformly selected message is encrypted with a key of length , then at least bits of information about have leaked into the ciphertext. (See, e.g., [1] for a formal treatment of message equivocation.) Despite this, we construct a family of encryption systems utilizing short keys which guarantee that for any message space with sufficient min-entropy, no adversary can predict any Boolean function of the message with nonnegligible advantage; specifically, if the message space has min-entropy , and secret keys of length are utilized, no Boolean function can be predicted with advantage . These systems rely on no unproven assumptions, and encryption (and decryption) can be computed efficiently. The precise notion of security is described below.
Of course, if a pseudorandom generator exists, then it is possible to construct encryption systems with satisfactory security guarantees against resource-bounded adversaries, even when the length of the message exceeds the length of the key. A traditionally accepted notion of security in this resource-bounded case is that of semantic security [2] , though a number of stronger (and important) notions exist (see, e.g., [3] - [6] ). A system with semantic security guarantees that observation of , the encryption of a message offers essentially no advantage to a bounded adversary in predicting any Boolean function of the message . (This Boolean function may be some specific bit of , or, perhaps, a complicated function capturing some global property of .) Furthermore, this guarantee is offered regardless of the a priori distribution of the message . In the last section of the paper, we discuss some potential applications of the information-theoretic encryption systems developed in Sections III and IV to this complexity-theoretic framework. Specifically, we observe that a hybrid approach can reduce the complexity of the resulting system at the expense of weakening (in a controlled fashion) the notion of semantic security. Finally, we mention that if the adversary is space limited and the parties have access to a long public random string, strong privacy guarantees can be obtained with short keys [7] - [11] .
Returning to the case of an unbounded adversary, we say that an encryption system offers entropically bounded security if for all message distributions with sufficient min-entropy, and all pieces of partial information , observation of the ciphertext of offers no adversary nonnegligible advantage in prediction of
. If the definition is strengthened so that it applies for all message spaces and the error terms in the advantage are removed, then we exactly recover the definition of perfect secrecy. (See the next section for precise definitions.) Initially, we give a simple encryption system offering entropic security in the case when the adversary has no a priori information about the message (i.e., the message distribution is uniform); the scheme can be realized with keys of length . We then show that for message spaces with min-entropy , an encryption system offering entropically bounded security can be realized with keys of length .
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The two main theorems in the paper, Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, are both instantiations of common paradigms in cryptography. The first is an information-theoretic variant of the standard practice of encrypting a short seed which is then used for a pseudorandom generator (in our case, this will be an -biased space). The second is a variant of the "simple embedding schemes" often used in practice, where a message is encrypted by applying a one-way permutation after a suitable (bijective) hash function. The system of Bellare and Rogaway [12] is also theoretical evidence for the quality of such schemes.
In Section II, we give basic definitions, including a brief discussion of -biased spaces, universal hash functions, and the Fourier transform over , which will be used in the main results, presented in Sections III and IV. In Section V, we discuss necessary conditions for this notion of encryption. Finally, in Section VI, we discuss some applications of these theorems to resource-bounded encryption systems.
II. DEFINITIONS

Definition 1:
A pair is a symmetric encryption system with parameters if 1 and are functions, determining the length of the secret key and the length of the encryption for messages of length , respectively, 2 is the family of encryption functions, and 3 is the family of decryption functions, so that for all , and . When the length of the message can be inferred from context, we write rather than . When an encryption system is clear from context, we let denote the random variable uniform on the set .
As previously defined, encryption and decryption are deterministic; in Section IV, we shall consider the case when the encryption algorithm may depend on some private randomness.
Definition 2:
A message space is a sequence of random variables so that takes values in . (When we couple with an encryption system, we always assume that is independent of , the secret key.)
A symmetric encryption system with parameters is said to possess perfect secrecy if for all message spaces , all , and all in particular, the probability distribution on the pair is identical to the product distribution of these random variables. In order to unify our presentation of various notions of security, we will adopt the following, equivalent, definition of perfect secrecy: Introducing some bias in the prediction probability and restricting our attention to message spaces of sufficient min-entropy results in the notion of security we study.
Definition 5:
We say that an encryption system possesses -entropic security if for every message space with min-entropy , every , and all functions , there is a random variable , independent of , so that for every If , we say this encryption system possesses -entropic security. Observe that if no constraint is placed on the min-entropy in and the , we recover the definition of perfect secrecy. We will construct two encryption systems, and , so that • possesses -entropic security (i.e., provides security when the message space is uniform) and uses keys of length , where is any function tending to infinity.
(and ) can be computed in time for any . • possesses -entropic security (i.e., provides security when the message space has min-entropy ) so long as and uses keys of length . (and ) can be computed in time . These constructions make use of -biased sample spaces and universal hash functions, defined later.
A. -Biased Sample Spaces
Definition 6: A set is called -biased (or anbiased sample space) if for all nonempty Small sets with these properties were initially constructed by Naor and Naor [13] and Peralta [14] . We will use a construction, due to Alon, Goldreich, Håstad, and Peralta [15] , which gives an -biased sample space in of size about .
The sample space is given as the image of a certain function . (Here denotes the finite field with elements.) To define , let be a bijection satisfying and , where denotes the componentwise exclusive-or of and . Then, , where , the inner product, modulo two, of and . The size of the sample space is . Let be the collection of points so defined. Alon et al. [15] prove the following theorem regarding this construction.
Theorem 1 ([15]):
is -biased.
Observe that when . As elements of are constructed during the encryption (and decryption) phase of the -entropic encryption system, we analyze the complexity of computing the function above. First, we need to find an irreducible polynomial of degree over the finite field . As the degree of the polynomial will correspond to the quantity , we can be somewhat flex- [17] , or the discussion in [18, p. 232]). As is sparse (it has only three nonzero terms), reducing this result modulo requires time. Hence, computation of requires time. In order for to be -biased, we take to be the smallest integer of form larger than ; in this case, the above running time is . To simplify notation, we let denote for this value of .
B. -Wise Independent Permutations
Definition 7: A family of permutations is a family of -wise independent permutations [19] if for all distinct and all distinct
We will use a family of -wise independent permutations, described below. See Rees [20] for a more detailed description. Let be a two-dimensional vector space over , a finite field. For two nonzero vectors and in this space, we write when for some (so that the two vectors span the same one-dimensional subspace). This is an equivalence relation; we write for the equivalence class containing . Projective -space over is then . We let denote the set of nonsingular matrices over , and , where is the identity matrix. An element of acts on in a natural (and well-defined) way, mapping to . It is not difficult to show that for any distinct and any distinct , there is in fact a unique so that for each . In particular, is a -wise independent family of permutations. As multiplication and inversion in a finite field , for a prime , may be accomplished in time time ([21] , [22] ), evaluation of an element at an element of also has this complexity.
Proposition 1:
is a -wise independent set of permutations of .
C. Fourier Analysis of Boolean Functions
Let denote the set of real-valued functions on . Though our interest shall be in Boolean functions, it will be temporarily convenient to consider this richer space. is a vector space over of dimension , and has a natural inner product: for , define , where is the projection of onto . These coefficients , are the Fourier coefficients of , and, as observed above, uniquely determine the function .
Given the above, it is easy to establish the Plancherel equality.
We remark that and, when the range of is .
III. SECURITY FOR UNIFORMLY DISTRIBUTED MESSAGE SPACES
We begin by constructing a simple encryption system offering security in the case when the adversary has no a priori knowledge concerning the message (i.e., the message space is uniform). The next section will develop a more flexible encryption system which can tolerate general message distributions, so long as they have sufficient min-entropy.
Theorem 2:
Let be the encryption system given by where and is selected randomly in the domain of (so )
. (Here is uniform on the domain of .) The random variable is defined in terms of the function ; though is independent of will predict nearly as well as does . Let be uniform on and independent of (and ). Define ; then
We begin with a claim providing an upper bound on this prediction probability which is independent of . 
As
, this completes the proof. The bound on and the running time of and follow from Section II-A. We remark that, aside from the running bounds, the proof is independent of the choice of the -biased space.
IV. SECURITY FOR ENTROPICALLY RICH MESSAGE SPACES
In this section, we describe a symmetric encryption system offering -entropic security; keys of length suffice. In preparation, we will slightly enrich our notion of symmetric encryption system by allowing the encryption function(s) to be stochastic: for each may depend on , the message , the secret key, and , some private random coins of the encryption function. To keep the notation uniform, we let be the random variable on which may depend. is independent of and .
For convenience, we will assume that the message space is for a prime . (So we treat , where is a random variable taking values in .) To keep our notation uniform, we let and then say that has min-entropy if for each . Now, we select an (artificial) bijection , so that for and can be computed in linear time;
can be computed by single inversion modulo . Having fixed this bijection, we will treat the -wise independent functions , described in Secttion II-B, as if they act on . Here is uniform on and is uniform on ; and are independent. We define the random variable , which predicts nearly as well as does though it is independent of and . As in the proof above, let and be a random variables with the same distributions as and ; all independent. Define the random variable . Observe that We begin by recording an analogue of Claim 1 for this cryptosystem which allows us to remove the dependence on . In this case, with probability at least , there are no more than messages that could have resulted in an observed ciphertext and there is an algorithm (4) Note that this algorithm is not, in general, efficient.
Remarks
We remark that at the expense of complicating the proof, it is possible to remove the factor of appearing in the denominator of (4).
VI. BOUNDED ADVERSARIES AND APPLICATIONS TO ASYMMETRIC ENCRYPTION
In many practical situations requiring public-key cryptography, encryption and decryption (with, e.g., RSA) are so expensive that they are used only to exchange a session key, which is then fed into some cheaper symmetric system. A similar approach is possible with the systems above.
As mentioned in the Introduction, a natural analog of the notion of perfect secrecy for resource-bounded adversaries is the notion of semantic security. This is the guarantee that no bounded adversary can predict any piece of partial information about the message with nonnegligible advantage. There is a range of complexity-theoretic assumptions which can give rise to such systems. In general, stronger assumptions allow implementations with improved efficiency. First, constructions are possible under "generic" assumptions, e.g., existence of a one-way trapdoor permutation [23] . Under the stronger assumption that factoring is hard, a system of Blum and Goldwasser [24] based on the Rabin functions encrypts (in a semantically secure fashion) an -bit message in time .
Here is the security parameter of the system. (It is interesting to note that under assumptions of a presumably stronger flavor, Cramer and Shoup [25] show that a constant number of exponentiations over a group suffice to encrypt a group element, in such a way that the resulting system is secure against even (adaptive) chosen ciphertext attack. In particular, hardness of the Diffie-Hellman decision problem is sufficient.)
As the encryption schemes of Theorem 3 are quite efficient, it is interesting to consider the (public-key) system obtained by applying an extant public key system to securely transmit the (short) shared key of . Specifically, if is the encryption algorithm for a public key system offering semantic security, one can study the behavior of the scheme which encrypts a message as ; here denotes the public key, the random string required for , and and the variables of Theorem 3. If, for example, the public key system is taken to be that of Blum and Goldwasser mentioned above, the hybrid system has running time , where is any function which tends to infinity. (Here is the security parameter of the system.) Note, however, that the resulting security guarantee will be weaker than that of semantic security: it requires message spaces of min-entropy . Before precisely describing the hybrid notion of security that such a system achieves, we shall shift notation to agree with [26] : when is a variable and a random variable, denotes the assignment of according to . If is simply a set, we abuse the notation by allowing to represent the random variable uniform on . In the sequel, we will use the term "algorithm" to refer to a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine. Furthermore, a "message generator" is an algorithm which, given , produces an output in the set (determined by the random coins of ), where is polynomially bounded in . Whenever a probability is expressed it is understood that the random coins of any algorithm appearing inside the brackets are to be included in the probability space.
When the underlying probability space of a variable is clear from context, we may simply write , or elide altogether. A public-key encryption scheme is described by a triple : here is a key generator algorithm which, given , generates a pair ; is the encryption algorithm, operating on a message , the public key , and a random string ; and is the decryption algorithm, operating on a ciphertext and the private key . Precise definitions are given in Section VII . See also [2] .
In particular, the system achieves the following hybrid notion of security.
Definition 8:
We say that an encryption system possesses computational -entropic security if for every message generator with minimum entropy , and every algorithm , there is an algorithm , such that for every polynomial , there exists an integer such that and where the first probability is taken over and . The second probability is taken over .
For comparison, the definition of semantic security is given in Section VII. We remark that a semantically secure encryption scheme possesses computational -entropic security for every polynomial .
The proof of security for this system follows the proof of Theorem 3 except that one needs to initially argue that availability of the semantically secure encryption of the secret key does not interfere with the security guarantee. This fact relies on a variant of an "elision" lemma originally proved in [2] , for which we give a new, streamlined proof.
The following lemma, which generalizes the original elision lemma of [2] , is due to [27] . We give a streamlined proof which improves upon previous proofs in the sense that it requires no sampling on the part of the constructed algorithm ( , in the proof below). It gives an error bound which depends only on a natural -norm of the message distribution. Roughly, the lemma asserts that a cryptosystem offering indistinguishability of encryptions possesses the property that any efficient computation performed with observation of , an encryption (and, perhaps, some related information) may as well have been performed without it. In the system mentioned above (coupling with ), this allows us to disregard the fact that the bounded adversary has witnessed a semantically secure encryption of the shared secret key ; the result is a security guarantee of the form appearing in Theorem 3 but for efficient adversaries.
Lemma 1:
Let denote an encryption system possessing indistinguishability of encryptions. Then for every message space and algorithm , there is an algorithm so that for all polynomials , all efficiently computable , and every polynomial and
The first probability is taken over and . The second probability is taken over and . Proof: The algorithm uses as a black box: given and proceeds as follows: generate and a random string of appropriate length; finally, return the value Observe that is exactly the probability In this case, the lemma is a consequence of the following claim. Here inequality follows because never exceeds when they are both defined. Then Hence, does not offer indistinguishability of encryptions.
As mentioned above, the Lemma follows immediately from the Claim.
VII. DEFINITIONS: SEMANTIC SECURITY, INDISTINGUISHABILITY OF ENCRYPTIONS
In order to keep the paper self-contained, we provide definitions for the relevant concepts from public-key cryptography below. We begin by defining a public-key cryptosystem.
Definition 9:
A public key encryption system is a triple , defined as follows.
• is an efficient probabilistic key generation algorithm, which, on input , produces a pair of keys, ; here denotes the "public key" and the "secret key."
• is an efficiently computable encryption algorithm which, given a message and public key , outputs , an encryption of the message using the key . We will consider probabilistic encryption systems, where may also depend on a sequence of random bits, . The encryption of with public key and random string is denoted .
• is an efficiently computable decryption algorithm which, given a ciphertext and secret key , produces a message for which for some .
Semantic security (and the equivalent notion of indistinguishability of encryptions) are defined as follows.
Definition 10:
We say that an encryption system possesses semantic security if for every message generator and every probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine , there is a probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine , such that and where the first probability is taken over (the coin tosses of ), and coin tosses of . The second probability is taken over all choices of and coin tosses of .
Definition 11:
We say that an encryption system possesses indistinguishability of encryptions if for every message generator , every algorithm , and for every polynomial , there exists an integer such that this probability being taken over , and selection of .
Theorem 5:
An encryption system is semantically secure if and only if it offers indistinguishability of encryptions.
The reverse implication was proven in [2] . The forward implication appears in [29] , [27] . We require a strengthened version of the reverse implication, which offers the same conclusion even when ancillary information is available (see the discussion in the last section). This strengthened version (which we refer to as an "elision lemma") was originally proved in [27] . Note that one consequence of this equivalence is that if the piece of partial information in the definition of semantic security is restricted to be a Boolean function, the notion of security is unchanged.
